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On Causation and Comparison: Medical Malpractice and 
other Professional Negligence After Steiner Corp. v. 
Johnson & Higgins* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Now God cannot be directly the cause of sin, either in 
Himself or in another, since every sin is a departure from 
the order which is to God as the end .... In like manner, 
neither can He cause sin indirectly. For it happens that 
God does not give some the assistance, whereby they 
may avoid sin, which assistance were He to give, they 
would not sin . . . . It is therefore evident that God is 
nowise a cause of sin. 1 
God has many names, but fortunately for organized religion, "The 
Initial Tortfeasor" is not one of them.2 According to the Christian 
philosopher St. Thomas Aquinas, apportioning any liability to God for 
the sins of mortals would be entirely inappropriate since, as a matter of 
law, "God cannot be directly the cause of sin."3 Certainly, such a 
conventional interpretation of the statement presents an intriguing 
theological idea. This note, however, offers a less reverent reading of 
Aquinas' proposition. 
It posits that when read in the context of tort law, Aquinas' reasoning 
bears a striking resemblance to that employed by the Utah Supreme 
Court in Steiner Corp. v. Johnson & Higgins ("Steiner Corp. IIF'). 4 The 
statement not only explains that God is not liable for the sins of 
* Copyright c 2002 Ryan M. Springer. The author would like to thank Christine Durham, Kif 
Augustine-Adams. and Denton M. Hatch for their assistance and guidance with this note. Any 
errors. hrmcvcr arc solely the responsibility of the author. 
I. 7 Sl TI!OMAS AQliiNAS, SUMMA TI!EOLO(;ICA 386-87 (Fathers of the English 
Dominican Province trans., Burns Oates & Wash bourne Ltd. 2d cd. 1927) ( 1265-1273 ). 
2. It is possible. however. that one might argue that God's liability for certain actions is 
implicitly couched in such tort doctrines as the "act of God" defense. For an introduction to this 
defense. absent any religious implications, s<'e DAN B. Dorms, TilE LAW OF TORTS§ 191 (2000) 
rhereinaltcr D<lllllS]. 
3. A<)llll\/\S, suf!m note I. at 386. 
4. 2000 UT 21, 996 1'.2d 531 rhcrcinaftcr .'i'teina Corp. Iff]. 
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humankind, but also provides an analogy that may be used to understand 
the complicated doctrine of comparative negligence. 
Steiner Corp. III dealt with Utah's comparative negligence laws, 
which establish a system of damages apportionment intended to 
distribute responsibility for the plaintiffs injuries among all the persons 
and entities that contributed to the harm. 5 The court, applying Utah's 
statutory scheme, held that liability for professional malpractice could 
not be apportioned to a plaintiff who caused the preexistent condition 
that created the need for the professional's assistance. The court 
explained that a preexistent condition "cannot be the cause, either 
proximate or direct, of the professional's failure to exercise an 
appropriate standard of care in fulfilling his duties."6 
The holding of Steiner Corp. III marks a significant departure from 
the common Jaw, but by doing so, it creates an appropriate balance of the 
policy considerations underlying Utah's comparative apportionment 
laws. As will be argued below, the Steiner Corp. III holding should also 
extend to situations where the preexistent conditions were caused by 
third-party tortfeasors as well as plaintiffs. 
The first section of this note explains briefly the development of the 
comparative negligence doctrine, including its statutory adoption in 
Utah.7 It also discusses two important interpretive cases as well as the 
subsequent effect of the Liability Reform Act. 8 The second section 
discusses the principal case, Steiner Corp. III, and several of the extra-
jurisdictional cases upon which it relies. The final section addresses the 
policy considerations of Utah's apportionment system as applied in 
medical malpractice situations. 
5. See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS§ 67 (5th ed. 
1984 & Supp. 1988) [hereinafter PROSSER AND KEETON]. 
6. Id at 533. 
7. This note does not extensively treat the development and dissemination of the 
comparative negligence doctrine. For a comprehensive discussion of this issue and its particular 
impact in Utah pre-Steiner Corp. 111 see Lee A. Wright, Comment, Utah's Comparative 
Apportionment: What Happened to the Comparison? 1998 UTAH L. REV. 543, 546-559. 
8. 1986 Utah Laws 470, (amending UTAH CODE ANN.§ 78-27-40 (Supp. 1986) (repealing 
tormer UTAH Cool' AN:-~.§ 78-27-40) (amended 1994)). 
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ll. THE ADOPTION OF UTAH'S COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE AND 
LIABILITY REFORM ACTS 
A. The Common Law: Contributory Negligence 
Although the doctrine of comparative negligence has roots as ancient 
as its contributory negligence counterpart,9 the latter doctrine was more 
widely accepted by the common law. One of the earliest cases involving 
contributory negligence is the 1809 case of Butte~field v. Forrester. 10 In 
Butterfield, the plaintiff sustained injuries from being thrown from his 
horse after it ran into debris negligently left in the road by the 
defendant. 11 Reasoning that "[a] party is not to cast himself upon an 
obstruction," Lord Ellenborough concluded that the plaintiff should be 
prohibited from recovering damages from the defendant. 12 
That reasoning gained favor throughout both England and America 
and the defense of contributory negligence became widely accepted as an 
absolute bar to recovery where a plaintiffs conduct contributed even 
slightly to the injuries. 13 It was not long, however, before the doctrine's 
application was limited. Courts started to recognize exceptions to the 
absolute defense of contributory negligence in cases where the 
defendant's conduct was intentional, wanton, or reckless, as well as in 
cases where the defendant had the last clear chance to avoid the injury. 14 
Before its decline, however, contributory negligence enjoyed a 
lengthy run in Utah, being accepted even prior to statehood15 and lasting 
through the early 1970s. 16 Nevertheless, Utah courts apparently struggled 
with the outcomes of pure contributory negligence and soon joined the 
other jurisdictions that recognized the various common exceptions. 17 
9. See A. Chalmers Mole and Lyman P. Wilson, A Study ol Comparative Negligence, 17 
CORNELL L.Q. 33 (1932); William L. Prosser, Comparative Negligence, 51 MICH. L. REV. 465, 475-
476. See also Wright, supra note 7, text accompanying notes 51-52. 
I 0. I 03 Eng. Rep. 926 (K.B. 1809). 
I I. See id. at 926-27. 
12. !d. 
13. See DOBBS, supra note 2, § 199 at 194. 
14. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 479 (1965); see also Fleming James, Jr., 
Contrihutory Negligence, 62 YALE L.J. 691, 706-729 (1953). 
15. See Lawrence & Mann v. Howard, I Utah 142 (1874). 
16. See Bridges v. Union Pac. R. Co., 488 P.2d 738, 740 (Utah 1971) ('The common law 
doctrine of contributory negligence has long been the rule of decision in the courts of this state, 
and ... has attained a status similar to a statutory enactment. The legislative power of this state is 
vested in the legislature ... and abrogation of the common-law doctrine of contributory negligence 
should be by legislative enactment."). 
17. See, eg, Holmgren v. Union Pac. R. Co., 198 P.2d 459,463 (Utah 1948) (recognizing 
the "last clear chance" exception); Jensen v. Denver & R.G.R. Co., 138 P. 1185, 1190 (Utah 1914) 
(recognizing exception where defendant's conduct manifested "reckless disregard"). 
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Even so, Utah was reluctant to abandon the doctrine altogether. IX But it 
was only a matter of time until the harsh results of contributory 
negligence were replaced in the majority of American jurisdictions, 
including Utah. 
B. The Rise of Comparative Negligence 
1. Adoption of comparative negligence in Utah 
Generally, comparative negligence is the term for a system of 
damages apportionment based on the relative fault of all responsible 
parties. 19 The doctrine resolves some of the inequities implicit in 
contributory negligence by including the plaintiffs percentage of fault in 
an apportionment of liability and then reducing the amount of the 
judgment by that percentage, rather than operating as an absolute bar to 
recovery.20 Its increasing popularity was likely the result of the same 
concerns that had motivated courts to develop the numerous exceptions 
to contributory negligence. 
State legislatures began to replace contributory negligence with 
comparative negligence in the 1970s. 21 Utah joined the movement in 
1973 by enacting its own Comparative Negligence Act.22 In addition to 
setting forth provisions for the new doctrine, the Comparative 
Negligence Act expressly put an end to contributory negligence. 23 
Somewhat paradoxically, however, Utah maintained the doctrine of 
joint and several liability. Under this common law doctrine, 
responsibility could be apportioned to multiple tortfeasors, but each 
defendant was individually liable for the entire award. 24 Therefore, in 
situations where one or more responsible parties were immune or 
otherwise insolvent, the remaining defendants would have to pay 
amounts of the judgment disproportionate to their share of fault. 25 
18. See Myers v. San Pedro, L.A. & S.L.R. Co., 116 P. 1119, 1121 (Utah 1911) (refusing to 
apply comparative negligence); see also Bridges, 488 P.2d. at 740. 
19. See VICTOR E. SCHWARTZ, COMPARATIVE NEGLI<iFNCE, ~ 2-1 at 31 (3d ed. 1994 & 
Supp. 2000) [hereinafter SCHWARTZ]. 
20. See PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 5, § 67. 
21. See SCHWARTZ, supra note 19, §~ 1-4 to -5. 
22. 1973 Utah Laws 710 (enacting UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 78-27-37 to -43 (Supp. 1973) 
(repealed, revised, and reenacted 1986, amended 1994, 1996, 1999)). 
23. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-27-37 (Supp. 1985) (repealed, revised, and reenacted 1986, 
amended 1994, 1996, 1999) ("Contributory negligence shall not bar recovery in an action by any 
person or his legal representative to recover damages for negligence ... resulting in death or in 
injury to person or property .... "). 
24. See PROSSER AND KEETON§ 47, supra note 5. 
25. See id. at 327-328 ("When joinder is permitted, it is not compelled, and each tortfcasor 
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The only legal remedy available to a defendant who paid a 
disproportionate share was a separate suit against the joint tortfeasors for 
contribution. In some cases, such as those involving plaintiffs who 
deliberately chose not to sue certain joint tortfeasors because of 
impecuniosity, defendants would have little legal recourse at all and 
would pay the price for another person's conduct. Whereas contributory 
negligence placed undue burdens squarely on the plaintiffs shoulders, 
joint and several liability placed burdens on solvent defendants.26 At best 
anomalous and at worst unjust, joint and several liability remained a part 
of Utah's comparative negligence scheme for a number of years. 
2. Incorporation of the "unit rule" 
An additional consideration involved in comparative negligence 
cases is the preliminary question of whether or not the negligence of 
separate tortfeasors should be aggregated or weighed separately. In 
1984, the Utah Supreme Court addressed this issue in Jensen v. 
Intermountain Health Care, Inc. 27 Although the decision provides only a 
sparse account of the facts, it explains that the decedent of the plaintiff 
died as a result of negligence on the part of a physician and hospital.28 A 
jury apportioned 46 percent of the fault for the decedent's death on his 
own negligence, and 18 and 36 percent on the physician and hospital, 
respectively?9 The jury awarded the plaintiff proportionate damages, but 
the trial court set the judgment aside for no cause of action since the 
decedent's own negligence exceeded that of either of the defendants' 
. d .. d II 10 m IVI ua y.· 
The trial court's decision was consistent with the minority 
"Wisconsin rule," which compares the fault of each defendant separately 
against the fault of the plaintiff.31 On appeal, however, the Utah Supreme 
Court specifically incorporated the more widely accepted "unit rule," 
which aggregates the fault of multiple defendants and compares it with 
the plaintiffs own.32 Applying this rule, the court combined the 
may be sued severally. and held responsible for the damage caused, although other wrongdoers have 
contributed to it."). 
2n. See id 
27. n79 P2d 903 (Utah 1994). 
28 !d 
29. !d 
30. !d. at 904. Under Utah's present comparative negligence statute, plaintiffs arc barred 
from recovery where their own negligence amounts to titly percent or more of the total fault; see 
UTAH CODE ANN. ~ 7S-27-3S ( 1996 & Supp. 200 I). 
31 !d. 
32. See id 
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negligence of the defendants, thus making them collectively responsible 
for 54 percent of the total fault, and remanded the case for entry of the 
. ' d' :l3 JUry s ver tct.-
Jensen is significant primarily for its adoption of the unit rule. 
However, it also illustrates that under the Comparative Negligence Act in 
1984, the negligence of the decedent was apportioned in a medical 
malpractice action. Under Utah law, decedents possess the right to 
commence wrongful death actions, but for obvious reasons, the right 
vests in the decedent's personal representatives or heirs. 34 In Jensen, the 
actual right of the action was the decedent's, and his negligence was 
apportioned along with the professional negligence of the physician and 
hospital. Therefore, the practical result of the Utah Supreme Court's 
decision was the apportionment of the plaintiffs own negligence. As will 
be discussed below, however, such apportionment of a plaintiffs 
negligence was specifically rejected in Steiner Corp. III. 
3. The Liability Reform Act 
The legislative acts adopted in Utah and their underlying policies 
provide some insight into the disparate outcomes in Jensen and Steiner 
Corp. III. In 1986, the Utah Legislature revised the Comparative 
Negligence Act by adopting the Liability Reform Act.35 Although the 
Reform Act retained some of the 1973 Comparative Negligence Act's 
provisions, it also made some important changes. One such change was 
the Reform Act's adoption of the term "comparative fault."36 The 
concept of "fault," which originally appeared in the Utah Supreme 
Court's decision in Mulherin v. Ingersoll-Rand Co.,37 was ultimately 
expanded to include both strict liabilit/8 and unknown or unidentified 
tortfeasors. 39 Most importantly, however, the adoption of "comparative 
fault" indicated the Utah Legislature's intent to significantly revise tort 
liability by shifting the focus from traditional tort doctrines to the 
singular inclusive concept of fault. 40 
33. ld at 909. 
34. See UTAH CODE ANN.§ 78-11-12 (1996 & Supp. 2001 ). 
35. See 1986 Utah Laws 470 (amending UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-27-40 (Supp. 1986) 
(repealing former UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-27-40) (amended 1994)). 
36. !d. 
37. 628 P.2d 130 I (Utah 1981) (applying comparative fault in a products liability case). 
38. See S.H. v. Bistryski, 923 P.2d 1376 (Utah 1996). 
39. See Field v. Boyer, 952 P.2d I 078 (Utah 1998). 
40. See Haff v. Hettich, 1999 NO 94, ~ 14, 593 N.W. 2d 383, 387. See also infra text 
accompanying notes 93-105. 
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Additionally, the express abandonment of the doctrine of joint and 
several liability further demonstrates the legislature's intent. The new 
statute declared that "no defendant shall be liable to any person seeking 
recovery for any amount in excess of the proportion of fault attributed to 
that defendant."41 This language illustrated the Legislature's 
dissatisfaction with the inequitable distribution of liability among parties 
present under the common law systems. Moreover, these legislative 
changes helped establish the doctrinal landscape for the Steiner Corp. III 
decision. 
C. Apportionment and Adjudication 
When considering the judicial applications of the Utah Legislature's 
statutory reform, it is important to keep in mind three of the major 
purposes of tort law. First, tort law exists to deter wrongful conduct.42 If 
persons are aware that there will be financial consequences for 
irresponsible behavior, they will be less likely to engage in tortious 
conduct.43 Second, tort law encourages socially responsible behavior.44 
By holding liable parties financially accountable for the consequences of 
their actions, persons have an incentive to behave responsibly.45 And 
finally, tort law serves to restore injured parties to their original condition 
by calculating damages and awarding financial remuneration.46 
Comparative negligence involves all of these policy considerations, but 
through its system of apportionment, focuses more immediately on the 
accountability concerns inherent in the second. As illustrated by the 
cases below, it is often difficult to satisfy all of the policy concerns 
equally. 
In 1993, several cases tested new language of the Reform Act while 
balancing the fundamental interests of tort law.47 The first of the post-
Reform Act cases to reach the Utah Supreme Court, Sullivan v. Scoular 
Grain Co.,48 is a significant benchmark in comparative fault 
jurisprudence in Utah.49 The case involved a personal injury claim 
41. UTAH CODE ANN.§ 78-27-38 (1996 & Supp. 2001 ). 
42. See DOBBS, supra note 2, § I. 
43. See id. 
44. See id. 
45. See id. 
46. See id. 
47. See Dahl v. Kerbs Constr. Co., 853 P.2d 887 (Utah 1993); Brown v. Boyer-Washington 
Boulevard Assoc. v. CCC & T, 856 P.2d 352 (Utah 1993); Ericksen v. Salt Lake City Corp. v. 
Projects Unlimited, Corp., 858 P.2d 995 (Utah 1993). 
48. 853 P.2d 877 (Utah 1993). 
49. For discussion on the impact of Sullivan, see Dale T. Hansen, Sullivan v. Scoular Grain 
Co.: Apportioning the Fault of' Immune Employers, 1994 BYU L. REV. 187; Geoffrey C. Haslam, 
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arising from a workplace accident. 50 Sullivan sued multiple defendants, 
including his employer, who was immune under the exclusive remedy 
provision of Utah's Workers' Compensation Law. 51 
Sullivan arrived at the Utah Supreme Court as two certified questions 
from the Federal District Court of Utah.52 First, the District Court asked 
if Utah's comparative negligence scheme allowed "a jury [to] apportion 
the fault of the plaintiffs employers that caused or contributed to the 
accident although said employers are immune from suit"; and second, 
whether a jury could "apportion the fault of an individual or entity that 
has been dismissed from the litigation but against whom it is claimed that 
they have caused or contributed to the accident."53 
Sullivan balanced the policy interests of restoring the plaintiff to his 
original condition with encouraging socially responsible behavior in 
situations where a partially accountable tortfeasor is immune from the 
judgment. If liability were apportioned to the immune employer, its 
immunity would relieve it of the financial responsibilities to the plaintiff. 
Consequently, the plaintiff could not fully recover and would therefore 
not be returned to his original condition. 
Conversely, if the immune employer were not included in the 
apportionment, the percentage of its fault would not be determined, 
which would potentially yield three results. First, the employer would not 
be notified of the extent of its fault, and therefore would presumably not 
know what corrective measures it might need to enact to prevent future 
injuries. Second, assuming the employer was aware of the nature of its 
duty, not apportioning a percentage of fault would encourage future 
recklessness since there could be no financially adverse consequence. 
And finally, since the percentage of the employer's fault would not be 
factored into the total damages equation, the remaining tortfeasors would 
have to share the financial responsibility for the employer's fault, thus 
effectively resurrecting the inequities of joint and several liability. 
Clearly, neither option could be entirely consistent with the 
legislative rejections of contributory negligence and joint and several 
liability and satisfy the attending policy concerns. Nevertheless, the court 
had to decide the issue based on the existing statutory language. Doing 
Apportioning the Comparative Fault of Non-party Joint Tortfeasors, 1994 UTAH L. REV. 444; Tim 
D. Dunn & W. Brent Wilcox, Significant Changes in Comparative Fault and Workers· 
Compensation Reimbursement, UTAH B.J. Aug.-Sept. 1994; Lee Edwards, Sullivan v. Scoular Grain 
Co. and the 1994 Amendments: Is Joint and Several Liability Really Dead in Utah?, 9 BYU J. PUB. 
L. 327. 
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so, the majority answered the District Court's first question 
affirmatively. The Utah Supreme Court explained that "apportionment of 
fault does not of itself subject the employer to civil liability. Rather, the 
apportionment process merely ensures that no defendant is held liable to 
any claimant for an amount of damages in excess of the percentage of 
fault attributable to that defendant."54 
On the second question, however, the court held that "an individual 
or entity dismissed from a case pursuant to an adjudication on the merits 
of the liability issue may not be included in the apportionment," 
explaining that "[ w ]hen a defendant is dismissed due to a determination 
of lack of fault as a matter of law, the defendant's exclusion from 
apportionment does not subject the remaining defendants to liability for 
damages in excess of their proportionate fault."55 
Although the decision was consistent with "the statutory scheme 
viewed in its entirety,"56 Justice Stewart vigorously dissented because of 
the policy shortcomings implicit in the result. 57 Recognizing that the 
statutory language indicated the Legislature's intent to exclude the 
negligence of non-immune persons, he argued that through abolishing 
joint and several liability, the Reform Act "divide[d] the fault of an 
immune party among both plaint!ff~ and defendants."58 Justice Stewart 
disagreed with the majority because its interpretation "load[ ed] ... fault 
entirely onto a plaintiff," thus returning to the inequity of abandoned 
common law doctrines. 59 
As indicated by the majority and dissenting opinions in Sullivan, the 
revised statutory scheme resulted in significant tension between the 
various policy considerations implicit in comparative negligence analysis 
and the statutory language. Seeking to alleviate that tension, the 
Legislature created a more accommodating balance between the interests 
of plaintiffs and defendants. In 1996, the Legislature responded to 
Sullivan by creating a new framework for liability apportionment in 
54. !d. 
55. !d. 
56. Brown v. Boyer-Washington Boulevard Assoc. v. CCC & T, 856 P.2d 352 at 355 (Utah 
1993) (Durham, J., concurring). See also Wright, supra note 7, at 577 (noting that the "inconsistency 
between the use of the terms 'person' and 'party' in the statute may show a lack of intent to limit the 
parties to whom fault can be attributed"). 
57. See Sullivan v. Scoular Grain Co., 853 P.2d 877 at 886 (Utah 1993). 
58. !d. (Stewart, J. dissenting) (emphasis in original). Justice Stewart's view, however, 
assumes that jurors would be "naturally inclined" to allocate the immune tortfeasor's fault among the 
plaintiffs and defendants. While this view is arguably more equitable, the fact remains that the 
statutory language provided no instructive mechanism to guide the jurors' inclinations, even if 
Justice Stewart's optimistic appraisal of human nature was correct. 
59. !d 
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cases involving immune tortfeasors. 60 The new system, still in place, 
provides that the liability of immune persons can be apportioned so long 
as the total percentage of their fault is less than 40 percent.01 If the 
immune person's fault exceeds 40 percent, however, courts are to reduce 
the percentage of fault to zero and reallocate that percentage among the 
other parties in proportion to the percentage of fault "initially attributed 
to each party by the fact finder. "62 
Ultimately, Sullivan and the subsequent statutory amendments 
illustrate the emphasis Utah's comparative negligence scheme places on 
accountability. Utah's statute is less concerned with the standing of 
parties vis-a-vis non-parties than with appropriately determining 
percentages of fault. And despite its attending controversies, Sullivan 
shows the difficultly in addressing accountability in light of other 
procedural obstacles. The statutory amendment, however, demonstrates 
the Legislature's desire to be as equitable as possible to parties in 
interest, regardless of the formal standing of parties. 
Ill. THE NEXT STEP: STEINER CORP. V. JOHNSON & HIGGINS 
A. History of the Case 
Steiner Corp., a privately owned leasing corporation, established a 
retirement plan to provide benefits for its employees. 63 Under the plan, 
employees were entitled to receive either a monthly annuity or a lump 
sum distribution as the retirement benefit. 64 Over time, the lump sum 
formula was modified into a layered formula that calculated payments 
based on fixed interest rates. 65 The monthly annuity, however, was paid 
out according to fluctuating market rates, and consequently, the lump 
sum option was more valuable than the monthly annuity.66 In 1977, the 
firm of Johnson & Higgins was hired as the actuary for the retirement 
plan.67 Although the majority of Steiner Corp.'s employees chose the 
more valuable lump sum, Johnson & Higgins evaluated the retirement 
plan based on the value of the annuities. 68 As a result, the retirement plan 
60. See UTAH CODE ANN.§ 78-27-39(2)(a) (1996 & Supp. 2001 ). 
61. !d. 
62. !d. 
63. Steiner Corp. v. Johnson & Higgins of California, 31 F.3d 935, 936 (I Oth Cir. 1994) cert. 
denied, 513 U.S. I 081, (1995) [hereinafter Steiner Corp.!]. 
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valuations substantially understated the value of the benefits and costs 
that Steiner Corp. had incurred.69 
In 1988, Steiner Corp. sued Johnson & Higgins for professional 
malpractice and breach of contract. 70 The trial court ultimately ruled 
partially in Steiner Corp.'s favor but rejected the primary claim for 
professional malpractice on the basis of Johnson & Higgins' contributory 
negligence defense. 71 Both sides appealed, and the Tenth Circuit 
affirmed in part, reversed in part, vacated in part, and remanded on the 
. . 72 
apportiOnment Issue. 
On remand, the trial court again rejected Steiner Corp.'s professional 
malpractice claims because under Utah's comparative negligence statute, 
Steiner Corp.'s negligence was comparatively greater than that of 
Johnson & Higgins.73 Steiner Corp. appealed, arguing the trial court 
erred in finding Steiner's negligence comparatively greater than that of 
Johnson & Higgins.74 The Tenth Circuit again reversed and remanded for 
a determination of causation and damages.75 
B. The Steiner Corp. Ill Decision: A Clear Direction for Utah's 
Comparative Negligence Scheme 
Upon receiving the Tenth Circuit's directions on remand, the trial 
court certified two legal questions to the Utah Supreme Court. 76 The first 
question was whether, under Utah law, negligent acts "causing or 
contributing to the situation that the plaintiff hired a professional to 
resolve can be the basis for comparative or contributory negligence 
defense."77 The second question was whether negligent acts "causing or 
contributing to the situation the plaintiff hired a professional to resolve 
can be considered in determining causation and damages."n The court 
answered "no" to both questions, holding that in spite of an actor's 
negligence in causing a preexistent condition, he or she "cannot be held 
to be contributorily negligent unless their negligence is causally 
69. !d. 
70. Steiner Corp. v. Johnson & Higgins of California, 135 F.3d 6R4, 685 (lOth Cir. 1998) 
[hereinafter Steiner Corp. II]. 
71/d 
72. See Steiner Corp. I. 
73. Steiner Corp. II at 6R5. 
74. !d. 
75. !d. at 694. 
76. Steiner Corp. Ill, 200 I UT 21, ~ I, 996 P.2d 531, 531-32. 
77. !d. 
78. !d. 
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connected" to the specific injury from which plaintiffs complaint seeks 
reiief. 79 
Although the facts in Steiner Corp. III dealt with an actuarial firm, 
the Utah Supreme Court also addressed other forms of professional 
malpractice in its holding.xo The court specifically stated that this 
principle mutually barred comparative and contributory negligence 
defenses "regarding medical ... services. ,x 1 Referring to the facts from a 
Texas medical malpractice case,82 the court stated that because 
negligence relating to a patient's preexistent condition "was not 
'simultaneous[ ] with or cooperating with' the fault for which the 
plaintiff sought recovery," the contributory negligence defense could not 
be raised. 83 Additionally, the court recognized that conduct relating to a 
preexistent medical condition "was not allowed as a defense because the 
malpractice caused a 'distinct subsequent injury, "'84 and that such 
instances of professional negligence were '"intervening or superseding 
cause[s]' without which there would have been no injury at all."x5 
This decision and its interpretation of Utah's comparative 
apportionment scheme have yet to be applied in a medical malpractice 
case. However, based on the reasoning of the opinion and the evidence of 
policy concerns implicit in various statutory revisions, it is apparent that 
its application will mark a significant departure from the common law in 
medical malpractice cases. More importantly, perhaps, that departure 
will enact the equitable considerations at the heart of comparative 
apportionment. 
IV. COMPARATIVE FAULT APPORTIONMENT IN MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 
CASES POST-STE!NtR COJW Ill 
A. Medical Malpractice Jurisprudence and the Common Lav.· 
Medical malpractice cases require a showing of burden beyond 
conventional negligence cases. In order to prove medical malpractice, the 
79. !d. at ,[4, 532. 
80. !d. at ,I 5, 532 ("When applying these principles to professional negligence, other courts 
have barred contributory negligence defenses based on the plaintiffs actions taken before obtaining 
the services of a professional. The defenses have been barred regarding medicaL legal, and 
accounting services." (citations omitted)). 
81. !d., at ,1~ 5-6, 532, citing Sendejar v. Alice Physicians & Surgeons Hosp .. Inc., 555 
S.W.2d 879 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977); Matthews v. Williford, 318 So.2d 480 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975): 
Bourne v. Seventh Ward Gen. Hosp. 54 So.2d 197 (La. Ct. App. 1989). 
82. Sendejar at 885. 
83. Steiner Corp. !II at ,[6, 532-33. 
84. !d. at ,[6, 533, citing Mal/hews at 483. 
85. !d., citing Bourne at 203. 
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plaintiff must prove ( 1) the standard of care required of physicians under 
similar circumstances practicing in the same field or specialty, (2) that 
the applicable standard of care was breached, (3) that the injury to the 
plaintiff was proximately caused by the defendant's negligence, and (4) 
that damages occurred as a result of the defendant's breach of duty. 86 
In traditional tort law, proximate cause is generally a question of fact 
and is to be decided by the jury.87 Malpractice cases, however, present 
some qualifications to this general rule. As the Utah Court of Appeals 
has explained, "[b ]ecause of the complex issues involved in a 
determination of proximate cause in a medical malpractice case, the 
plaintiff must provide expert testimony establishing that the health care 
provider's negligence proximately caused plaintiffs injury."88 The Utah 
Supreme Court has recognized proximate cause in the context of 
professional malpractice as "that cause which, in natural and continuous 
sequence, unbroken by efficient intervening cause, produces injury and 
without which the result would not have occurred."89 The court added 
that proximate cause is also "the efficient cause which necessarily sets in 
operation the factors that accomplish the injury."90 
This concept of proximate cause is consistent with the common law 
doctrine articulated in the Restatement. Section 457 of the Restatement 
states, "If the negligent actor is liable for another's injury, he is also 
subject to liability for any additional bodily harm resulting from normal 
efforts of third persons in rendering aid which the other's injury 
reasonably requires, irrespective of whether such acts are done in a 
proper or negligent manner."91 Under this doctrine, parties who are the 
proximate cause of a plaintiffs injuries are liable for damages resulting 
from foreseeable consequences of the original tort.92 
R6. Dalley v. Utah Valley Reg'! Medical Ctr., 791 P.2d 193, 195 (Utah 1990). See also 
Nixdorfv. Hicken, 612 P.2d 348,354 n. 17 (Utah 1980) (holding that the plaintiff has the burden to 
prove that the defendant's negligence was the proximate cause of the injury). 
87. Mahmood v. Ross, 1999 UT 104, ,[22, 990 P.2d 933, 938. 
88. Kent v. Pioneer Valley Hosp., 930 P.2d 904 (Utah App. 1997). See also Chadwick v. 
Nielsen, 763 P.2d 817, 821 (Utah App. 19R8) ("Due to the technical and complex nature of a 
medical doctor's services, expert medical testimony must be presented at trial in order to establish 
the standard of care and proximate cause."). 
89. Harline v. Barker, 912 P.2d 433, 439 (Utah 1996). See also Mahmood, at~ 22, 938; 
Butterfield v. Okubo, 831 P.2d 97, 106 (Utah 1992); State v. Lawson, 688 P.2d 479,482 n.3 (Utah 
1984). 
90. Har/ine,912P.2dat439(Utah 1996). 
91. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS§ 457 (1965). 
92. See id, cmt. a 
("[D]amages assessable against the actor include not only the injury originally caused by 
the actor's negligence but also the harm resulting from the manner in which the medical, 
surgical, or hospital services are rendered, irrespective of whether they are rendered in a 
mistaken or negligent manner, so long as the mistake or negligence is of the sort which is 
recognized as one of the risks which is inherent in the human fallibility of those who 
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This policy makes sense when considered under the traditional joint 
and several liability schemes that were in place when the Restatement 
was drafted. Under joint and several liability, plaintiffs could still recover 
fully for damages from negligent medical practitioners even if the 
original tortfeasor were insolvent or otherwise unavailable, so long as the 
negligent practitioners were parties to the case. But as the cases 
discussed below illustrate, the wisdom of the Restatement's position is 
suspect when considered in light of the policy concerns inherent in 
contemporary comparative apportionment schemes. 
B. Extra-Jurisdictional Support 
State courts have begun to recognize that it is inappropriate to 
apportion liability for malpractice to initial parties, whether plaintiffs or 
third parties. For example, North Dakota's Supreme Court recently held 
in Haffv. Hettich that "an original tortfeasor is not liable ... for damages 
caused by medical malpractice in treating the original injury.'m In that 
case, the plaintiff had been injured in an automobile accident with the 
defendant. 94 The plaintiff sought treatment for his injuries from the 
accident from a chiropractor, who subsequently administered negligent 
care.
95 The plaintiff argued in accordance with the common law that 
"subsequent improper medical treatment is a direct and proximate 
consequence of an original tortfeasor's acts.''96 The court, applying a 
comparative apportionment scheme materially comparable to Utah's, 
disagreed. 97 They explained: 
We dec! ine to construe the [comparative fault statute] to 
impose liability on an original tortfeasor for an 
intervening cause like medical malpractice that the 
original tortfeasor was deemed to foresee under common 
law, because that interpretation would render 
meaningless the language for determining the percentage 
of fault and damages attributable to each person and for 
allocating several liability to each party for the amount 
render such services."). !d. 
93. 1999 NO 94, ,[14, 593 N.W. 2d 383, 385. 
94. !d. at ,[2, 385. 
95. !d. 
9ti. !d. at ,[9, 386. 
97. North Dakota has also adopted "comparative fault" language and follows the unit rule. 
Compare UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-27-38 (4) (1996 & Supp. 2001) with N.D. CENT. CODE§ 32-03.2-
0 I to -02 ( 1996 ); See also Mark Richard Hanson, Comment, Negligence- The Unit Rule and North 
Dakota's Comparative Negligence Statute, 64 N.D. L. REV. 135 ( 1998). 
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of damages attributable to the percentage of fault of that 
party.98 
369 
HajJ clearly and capably illustrates the appropriateness of extending 
Steiner Corp. JJJ's holding to cover all original tortfeasors, not merely 
plaintiffs, that cause preexisting conditions for which medical attention is 
sought. 
Additionally, this conclusion is implicitly supported by one of the 
cases cited to in the Steiner Corp. III opinion, Lamoree v. Binghamton 
General Hospita/. 99 In that case, a woman shot a man in the leg while he 
was attempting to enter the woman's mother's home. 100 The defendant 
hospital subsequently admitted the man for treatment of the gunshot 
wound, where after nearly eighteen hours of waiting, he died. 101 
Ironically, the woman who shot the decedent was his estranged 
companion, and as such, became the administrator of his estate. 102 This 
gave her the legal standing to sue for wrongful death in his behalf, so she 
brought malpractice suits against the hospital and the attending 
physician. 103 The defendants argued that since "the death of the 
plaintiffs intestate and the damages and injuries referred to in the 
plaintiffs complaint were caused or contributed to, in whole and part, by 
the plaintiff administratrix and by the plaintiffs intestate," that 
consideration of comparative negligence was appropriate. 104 The court, 
however, held: 
Any tortious acts of the defendants ... were successive 
and independent of any act of the plaintiff and the 
decedent. ... Since the complaints allege negligence on 
the part of the defendants after admission to the hospital, 
any conduct on the part of the plaintiff administratrix or 
the plaintiff's intestate before admission to the hospital 
should not be considered as a defense by the defendants 
for any negligence or improper treatment after the 
plaintiff's intestate was admitted to the hospital. 105 
Lamoree perfectly illustrates the immateriality of a party's standing 
when applying comparative negligence analysis. Based on the New York 
court's reasoning, the outcome would have been the same with regard to 
Ms. Lamoree's contribution to the injury regardless of whether she was 
98. Haffat 'IJ9, 386. 
99. 329 N.Y.S. 2d 85 ( 1972). 
100. !d. at 87-88. 




105. !d. at 90 (emphasis added). 
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the plaintiff or merely a third-party tortfeasor. It was little more than 
coincidence that she, as the initial tortfeasor, also became the plaintiff in 
behalf of the decedent. The logic of the case, as well as its role in the 
Steiner Corp. III holding, justifies Utah's departure from common law 
medical malpractice jurisprudence, and warrants the extension of the 
holding to third parties as well as plaintiffs. 
C. Policy Shifts, Comparative Fault, and Medical Malpractice 
Under the common law, concerns about proportionate distribution of 
fault and equitable apportionment of liability were not as important as 
punitive deterrence, as indicated by the harshness of contributory 
negligence and joint and several liability. The recent directions taken in 
Utah's comparative apportionment jurisprudence and legislation, 
however, illustrate that fairness and accountability have become primary 
policy considerations in Utah and other jurisdictions. Currently, courts 
seek to determine actual fault and allocate financial responsibility 
accordingly. 
Steiner Corp. III clearly reflects this attention to equity in its holding. 
The court explained that for someone to be contributorily negligent, "his 
negligence must relate or contribute to the alleged injury caused by the 
professional stemming from the professional relationship." 106 It is 
impractical to think that the negligence or fault of one actor in creating a 
preexisting condition could actually contribute to the professional's 
negligence. It is also impractical to think that Steiner Corp. Ill's 
reasoning should apply only to plaintiffs and not to third-party tortfeasors 
as well. In unequivocal language, without reference to the legal standing 
of any party, the Utah Supreme Court stated "that a preexisting condition 
that a professional is called upon to resolve cannot be the cause, either 
proximate or direct, of the professional's failure to exercise an 
appropriate standard of care in fulfilling his duties." 107 
Additionally, Steiner Corp. JJI reflects attention to policy concerns of 
actual accountability. The court noted that attributing fault for a 
professional's malpractice to another actor "would allow professionals to 
avoid responsibility for the very duties they undertake to perform." 108 
Considering the common law systems of apportionment, however, it is 
apparent that attention to accountability was not a primary concern. It is 
106. Steiner Corp. Ill, 2001 UT 21. ,[4. 996 P.2d 531, 532. 
107. !d. at~ 7, 533 (emphasis added). 
108. !d. 
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also apparent that not only should Steiner Corp. III be recognized as a 
departure from the common law, but also as a welcome one. 109 
D. Medical Malpractice Jurisprudence after Steiner Corp. Ill 
If Steiner Corp. III's language is taken on its face, the apportionment 
of an initial tortfeasor's fault in professional negligence cases under the 
third element of proving medical malpractice is automatically excluded. 
The holding, as a matter of law, eliminates the ability to determine 
proximate cause for malpractice because "a preexisting condition that a 
professional is called upon to resolve cannot be the cause, either 
proximate or direct, of the professional's failure to exercise an 
appropriate standard of care in fulfilling his duties." 110 
This conclusion effectively sustains the Liability Reform Act's 
abandonment of the joint tortfeasor doctrine. Additionally, Steiner Corp. 
111 dealt with a preexistent condition caused by the plaintiffs, which 
would traditionally have been subject to a contributory negligence 
analysis. However, the court implicitly acknowledged the immateriality 
of the parties' legal standing, explaining that although answering 
certi fled questions dealing with what was traditionally subject to the 
doctrine of contributory negligence, "[s]ince comparative principles have 
previously been applied in cases dealing with contributory negligence, 
we will address the two doctrines together." 111 Ultimately, the conclusion 
advances Utah comparative fault jurisprudence beyond the common 
law's traditional restraints and justifications. 
109. It should also he noted that Utah's ahility to move in such a direction is somewhat 
unique. Compared with other jurisdictions where comparative negligence statutes are to be 
interpreted in derogation to the common law, such progress could not occur. For instance, Florida, 
despite a comparative negligence scheme similar to Utah's, is required to interpret the doctrine with 
deference to the common law. See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. McDonald, 676 So. 2d 12, ](,(Fla. Dist. 
Ct. /\pp. 1996) ("'fking in derogation of the common law,. Florida Statues must be strictly 
construed in favor of the common law." (citations omitted)). Utah's Legislature, however, has 
provided that: 
The rule of !he eommon law that statutes in derogation thereof are to be strictly construed 
has not application to the statutes of this state. The statutes estahlish the laws of this state 
respecting subjects to which they relate, and their provisions and all proceedings under 
them are to he liberally cons\ rued with a view to effect the objects of the statutes and to 
promote .Justice. Whenever there is any variance between the mlcs of equity and the mles 
of co1n1non law 111 reference lo the same matter, the rules of equity shall prevail. 
lJ lA II ( CHJI /\1\'1. 0 6X-]-2 (I 996 & Supp. 2001) 
II 0 .')rei ncr ( 'mp. Ill at ,I 7, 533. 
I I I ld a!,! 4 .. "il2. 
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the plaintiff or merely a third-party tortfeasor. It was little more than 
coincidence that she, as the initial tortfeasor, also became the plaintiff in 
behalf of the decedent. The logic of the case, as well as its role in the 
Steiner Corp. Ill holding, justifies Utah's departure from common law 
medical malpractice jurisprudence, and warrants the extension of the 
holding to third parties as well as plaintiffs. 
C. Policy Shifts, Comparative Fault, and Medical Malpractice 
Under the common law, concerns about proportionate distribution of 
fault and equitable apportionment of liability were not as important as 
punitive deterrence, as indicated by the harshness of contributory 
negligence and joint and several liability. The recent directions taken in 
Utah's comparative apportionment jurisprudence and legislation, 
however, illustrate that fairness and accountability have become primary 
policy considerations in Utah and other jurisdictions. Currently, courts 
seek to determine actual fault and allocate financial responsibility 
accordingly. 
Steiner Corp. Ill clearly reflects this attention to equity in its holding. 
The court explained that for someone to be contributorily negligent, "his 
negligence must relate or contribute to the alleged injury caused by the 
professional stemming from the professional relationship." 106 It is 
impractical to think that the negligence or fault of one actor in creating a 
preexisting condition could actually contribute to the professional's 
negligence. It is also impractical to think that Steiner Corp. lll's 
reasoning should apply only to plaintiffs and not to third-party tortfeasors 
as well. In unequivocal language, without reference to the legal standing 
of any party, the Utah Supreme Court stated "that a preexisting condition 
that a professional is called upon to resolve cannot be the cause, either 
proximate or direct, of the professional's failure to exercise an 
appropriate standard of care in fulfilling his duties." 107 
Additionally, Steiner Corp. Ill reflects attention to policy concerns of 
actual accountability. The court noted that attributing fault for a 
professional's malpractice to another actor "would allow professionals to 
avoid responsibility for the very duties they undertake to perform." 108 
Considering the common law systems of apportionment, however, it is 
apparent that attention to accountability was not a primary concern. It is 
I 06. Steiner Corp. Jfl, 200 I UT 21, ~]4. 996 P.2d 531, 532. 
107. ld at~ 7, 533 (emphasis added). 
108 Jd 
